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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS

S

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES UNDER SECTION 409(a)
OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT: MEANING
OF "REPRESENTATIVE"

ECTION 409(a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 19381 authorizes the
Civil Aeronautics Board to prohibit interlocking directorate relationships which are detrimental to the public interest and to approve the relationships which are not detrimental to the public interest. Congress by
enacting Section 409(a) has not only prescribed that one individual may
not serve as an officer or director of two or more 409(a) companies 2 but
has also sought to prevent circumvention of its intent by prohibiting the
use of a representative or nominee.
In Lehman v. Civil Aeronautics Board3 the question arose whether
partners in an investment banking firm represent each other to the extent
that this partner relationship alone can create an interlocking directorate
subject to prohibition by the CAB. The court held that a prohibited relation
152 STAT. 1002 §409(a) (1938), 49 U.S.C. §489 (a) (1946) which section is set
out in full below:
See. 409 (a) After one hundred and eighty days after the effective
date of this section, it shall be unlawful, unless such relationship shall
have been approved by order of the Board upon due showing, in form
and manner prescribed by the Board, that the public interest will not
be adversely affected thereby (1) For any air carrier to have and retain an officer or director who
is an officer, director, or member, or who as a stockholder holds a controlling interest, in any other person who is a common carrier or is
engaged in any phase of aeronautics.
(2) For any air carrier, knowingly and willfully, to have and retain
an officer or director who has a representative or nominee who represents such officer or director as an officer, director, or member, or as a
stockholder holding a controlling interest, in any other person who is a
common carrier or is engaged in any phase of aeronautics.
(3) For any person who is an officer or director of an air carrier to
hold the position of officer, director, or member, or to be a stockholder
holding a controlling interest, or to have a representative or nominee
who represents such person as an officer, director, or member, or as a
stockholder holding a controlling interest, in any other person who is
a common carrier or is engaged in any phase of aeronautics.
(4) For any air carrier to have and retain an officer or director who
is an officer, director, or member, or who as a stockholder holds a controlling interest, in any person whose principal business, in purpose or
in fact, is the holding of stock in, or control of, any other person engaged
in any phase of aeronautics.
(5) For any air carrier, knowingly and willfully, to have and retain
an officer or director who has a representative or nominee who represents
such officer or director as an officer, director, or member, or as a stockholder holding a controlling interest, in any person whose principal
business, in purpose or in fact, is the holding of stock in, or control of,
any other person engaged in any phase of aeronautics.
(6) For any person who is an officer or director of an air carrier to
hold the position of officer, director, or member, or to be a stockholder
holding a controlling interest, or to have a representative or nominee
who represents such person as an officer, director, or member, or as a
stockholder holding a controlling interest, in any person whose principal
business, in purpose or in fact, is the holding of stock in, or control of,
any other person engaged in any phase of aeronautics.
2 The term "409 (a) company" as used herein includes: air carriers, common
carriers, and any other person or persons engaged in any phase of aeronautics.
8209 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; cert. denied 347 U.S. 916 (1954).
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existed; therefore, it affirmed the Board's disapproval of the interlocking
directorate.
Both phases of the case concerned Mr. Robert Lehman, a partner in an
investment banking firm which dealt in the financing of companies in the
air transportation industry. Since Mr. Lehman desired to act as a director
of two 409 (a) companies 4 he petitioned the CAB for the approval required
by the Act. In this first phase of the case, the Board, noting that Mr. Lehman and other members of Lehman Brothers held directorships in various
air carriers, 5 instituted on its own initiative a separate proceeding to
determine whether the interlocking relationship provisions of Section
409(a) were being violated by the Lehman Brothers partners. The CAB
consolidated both proceedings 6 and ruled that both situations gave rise to
interlocking relationships which were not in the public interest and should
not be approved. The Lehman partners appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals 7 and on appeal to the court affirmed the ruling of the CAB. 8
In considering the first phase of the case the court held that there was
a sufficient present and potential conflict of interest between the two firms
on which Mr. Lehman petitioned to serve, to support the Board's disapproval
of the interlocking relationship. 9 The opinion pointed out that no actual
injury need be shown as the Civil Aeronautics Act is preventive in nature
and the burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that the public interest
will not be adversely effected by the proposed interlocking directorate.' 0
Since one of the purposes of the Act is to free the aeronautics industry
from any interlocking relationships which might impede development and
competition, even a slight or potential conflict could be termed adverse to
the public interest and thereby violate the Act. The ruling is consistent
with the prior policy of the CAB and the courts in regard to the first phase
of the case." Assuming the competitive position of the two firms and the
4 Mr. Lehman was currently serving as a director of Pan American World
Airways, an air carrier some of whose business is conducted in the Caribbean.
He desired to become a director of United Fruit Company, a sea carrier approximately three (3) per cent of whose business consisted of passenger transportation
in the Caribbean.
sMessr. Lehman, Thomas, and Ehrman were directors of Pan American
World Airways, National Air Lines, and Continental Air Lines respectively.

6 Lehman Brothers Interlocking Relationships Case, Docket No. 3605, including Docket Nos. 2678 and 4566, May 21, 1953, CAB E-6447.
7Appeal from CAB ruling allowed §1006 CAA, 52 STAT. 1024, 49 U.S.C.A.
§646 (1938).
8 See note 3 supra.
9 It is arguable that due to the nature of the service provided by the two
concerns there is in fact no real conflict of interest or competition. United Fruit
Company is primarily an importer with passenger accommodations on some of its
vessels offering leisurely ocean cruises whereas, Pan American Airways provides
rapid air travel. However, since both concerns actively solicit tourist traffic the
of the CAB and the court appears sound.
position
0
1 Ames-Continental Air Lines, Interlocking Relationships, 1 C.A.A. 498
(1939) (denial of petition for a common director of an air carrier and an
aircraft manufacturer on the basis of potential interest conflict, i.e., possible

interference with free choice of carrier when buying equipment).

Darling-Canadian Colonial Air Lines, Interlocking Relationships, 1 C.A.A.

641(1940) (denial of petition for a common director of an air carrier and a
company holding securities in"various companies engaged in aeronautics wherein
the CAB stated at page 647: . . . the applicants have not sustained the burden,
placed upon them by the statute, of showing that the public interest will not be
adversely affected by the proposed interlocking relationship .. . ).
11All American-Du Pont, Interlocking Relationships, 8 C.A.B. 672 (1947)
(competition was between an air carrier and a common carrier serving the same
general area; therefore, the interlocking relation was denied approval).
Pan American Airways-Hanes, Interlocking Relationships, 8 C.A.B. 617

(1947) (the CAB had previously approved the interlocking relationship but, be-
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identity of the director, the situation falls squarely within the direct prohibition of Section 409(a).
The second phase of the case presents a more interesting problem and
one which could have far reaching consequences. Here one man is not
serving as a director of two 409(a) companies; rather two 409(a) company
directors are associated by their membership in an investment banking
partnership, a non-409(a) company. 12 The question that arises is whether
these partners are representatives of one another within the purview of
Section 409(a). The CAB concluded that there was representation, and
the court affirmed the Board's finding.
Lehman Brothers is actively engaged in financial dealings with 409 (a)
companies and through its investment banking business is closely associated
with the aeronautics industry as a whole. 13 The court reasoned that various
Lehman partners when acting as directors cannot disassociate themselves
from their partnership interests or those of their fellow partners. 14 Using
this analysis the court concluded that these partners in this firm are representatives of one another when acting as 409(a) company directors and
thus fall within the "representative or nominee" clause of the Act. The
effect of this decision is that the determination of the question of whether
or not partners are representatives of one another will turn on the nature
of the partnership enterprise and its association with the air transportation
industry. 1 5
Beside the approach adopted by the court the "representative or nominee"
clause of Section 409(a) permits two other approaches to this question:
(1) all partners are representatives of one another within the Act, and (2)
partners are never representatives of one another within the Act.
The court considered the first alternative that mere association of 409 (a)
company directors in some non-409(a) enterprise would always make the
directors representatives of one another within the Act. However, it properly dismissed this alternative. 1 6
cause of new passenger service offered, found an interest conflict at this later
date and struck down the relationship).
See also, 42 Geo. L. J. 140(1953) ; 39 VA. L. R. 975 (1953). Both publications
oint out the consistency of the instant decision and the prior attitute of the CAB
n regard to the interlocking relationship between Pan American Airways and
United Fruit Company.
12 The Lehman Brothers case involved numerous situations wherein the CAB
found interlocking directorates. The final result was that all but the relations set
out in note 5 supra, were approved.
18 A substantial part of the Lehman Brothers business is the underwriting of
security issues for concerns in the air transportation industry.
14 See note 6 supra, where the CAB characterized the representation among
the Lehman partners as follows:
" ... The efforts of a Lehman partner who is a director of a section
409 (a) enterprise to obtain for Lehman Brothers the underwriting business of that enterprise would be a matter of financial interest to another
Lehman partner who is a director of an air carrier which may compete
for traffic with that enterprise. In such a situation it might well be that
the prospects for Lehman Brothers obtaining this underwriting business
could be materially enhanced if a Lehman partner could arrange for less
vigorous competition for the traffic by the air carrier. If the section
409(a) enterprise were a potential supplier air craft rather than a competitor for traffic, efforts to obtain underwriting business from the supplier might include efforts to facilitate sale of its products to the air
carrier ......
15 The Lehman Brothers case should be carefully restricted; it unquestionably
does not hold that partnership relation alone creates that kind of representation
which the language of the Act seeks to prohibit. See note 16 infra.
16 Lehman v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 209 F.2d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1953):
" . .. Community of interest due to membership in a partnership is
not in and of itself sufficient to require approval of the relationship incident to partners being directors of Section 409 (a) companies. . . . For
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The second alternative, that association of 409 (a) company directors
through membership in a non-409 (a) company regardless of the nature of
its business never creates representation within the meaning of the Act,
seems to have considerable merit, although it was rejected by the majority
of the court.
The legislative history of the Act supports the second alternative. First,
the Senate version of the present Act contained, in addition to "representa17
tive or nominee," the words or otherwise. These latter words were dropped
when the Act was passed. This would indicate that the present Act permits
some relationships which the Senate version would have excluded-8
Second, Congress declined to regulate
perhaps partnership association.'
all interlocking relationships between an air carrier and an investment
19
Congress indicated that investment banking concerns
banking concern.
20
But the court by looking to the nature
were not to be 409(a) companies.
of this firm to determine whether the partners represented each other, in
effect, erroneously put this investment banking firm in the class of a 409 (a)
company as soon as more than one of its partners served as an air carrier
director. Third, the basic concept of Section 409(a) is expressed in subsection (1) which makes it unlawful for one person to act as a director of
more than one company without first securing approval from the CAB. To
prevent circumvention of the prohibition, subsection (2) makes it unlawful
for the carrier and subsection (3) makes it unlawful for the person to
avoid the prohibition of Section 409(a) (1) by the use of a representative
or nominee. 21 The comments of the draftman indicate that the purpose of
this "representative or nominee" clause was to prevent evasion of the
one man holding a dual directorate through the use of
prohibition against
22
a strawman.
example, if the community of interest is due to membership in a partnership which owns a drug store it could hardly be said that this caused one
partner to be the representative of another in their respective capacities
as directors of Section 409 (a) companies ..... "
17 SEN. 3845, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. §410 (1938):
" ...it shall be unlawful... for any person who holds the position
of ...director in any air carrier to hold the position of... director...
either directly or through a representative or nominee or otherwise ...
in any other air carrier . . . " (Emphasis added.)
IsIt could be argued that the elimination of "or otherwise" made the "representative or nominee' clause more all inclusive or that the words "or otherwise"
were merely repetitious and therefore unnecessary.
19 In 1943, H.R. 3420, to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act, was reported out
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Section 409 (a) (B) of
this bill made it unlawful "for any air carrier to have and retain an officer or
director who is an officer, director, or member of, or who controls, any other
" The bill also made it unlawful for
person.... (B) who is an underwriter ....
a director of an air carrier "to hold the position of officer, director, or member"
of any person who is an underwriter. Commenting on this section of the bill the
House Report states: "The principal change of substance is the inclusion within
the scope of section 409 of interlocking relationships between . . . air carriers
and underwriters .... " H.R. REP. No. 784, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1943). The
bill was committed to the Committee of the Whole House but was not accepted.
20 Since one of the primary functions of an investment banking concern is
underwriting, it would seem that investment banking partners are not prohibited
per so from serving as air carrier directors. See note 19 supra, where the proposed addition to §409(a) which would have included underwriting concerns
within the category of 409 (a) companies was not adopted.
21 Subsections (4), (5), and (6) extend the prohibition in a similar manner
to holding companies in the aeronautical industry.
22 Mr. Clinton M. Hester, Assistant General Counsel for the Treasury Department, who appeared on behalf of the Interdepartmental Committee drawing
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 made the following comments which became
part of the Congressional record.
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce H.R. REP. No. 9738,
75th Cong. 3rd Sess. (1938) at page 45:
"15. Interlocking Directorates. H.R. 7273 prohibits any person from
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The second alternative gains further support if the interlocking relationship provision of the Act is compared with the similar provision of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. The Holding Company Act
declares that " . .. no registered holding company . . . shall have, as a...
director ... any ... partner ...
or representative of any . .. investment
banker ....
"23
If "representative" includes "partners" Congress would
not have added the word "partner" in the Holding Company Act.
A literal interpretation of Section 409(a) also favors the second alternative. Such an approach would seem proper in view of the minute detail4
2
with which Congress expressed the interlocking directorate prohibitions.
Analysis of the detailed language of Section 409(a) appears to require
that present representation must be found to exist before the CAB has
authority to determine whether or not the statutory relationship is detrimental to the public interest. The Act requires the having of a representative.25 In the instant case neither the CAB nor the court found present
representation, only a possibility of future representation.2 6 Under the
Civil Aeronautics Act the Board may disapprove a relationship solely because there is a possibility that in the future the relationship may adversely
effect the public interest. However, before the CAB has authority to conoccupying the position of officer or director of more than one carrier or
an air carrier and an aeronautical company unless such relationship is
approved by the Commission. That is the Interstate Commerce Commission in last year's Bill. The analogous provisions of the present bill,
H.R. 9738 are substantially similar, but are extended to prohibit any
person from being an officer or director of an air carrier and a common
carrier or an aeronautical holding company without the approval of the
new civil aviation agency (the C.A.B.). Moreover the present bill imposes these prohibitions upon the air carrier employing the officer or
director as well as upon the officer or director himself. In addition in
order to prevent evasion of these provisions, the present bill prohibits
an air carrier from employing a representative or nominee to act as an
officer or director in another air carrier, common carrier, or aeronautical
company. The additional provisions were deemed essential to insure complete protection from the evils which may arise from Interlocking directorates." (Emphasis added.)
23
Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 831; 15 U.S.C.A. §79 (q) (c)
(1935).
24 See note supra.
25"
. . it shall be unlawful, unless such relationship shall have been approved by order of the (Board) upon due showing . . . that the public interest
will not be adversely affected thereby . . . for any . . . director of an Air Carrier . . . to have a representative . . . in any other carrier. See note 1 supra.

(Emphasis added.)
26 The CAB states that the word "representative" is to be given its ordinary
meaning. See note 6 supra, where the Board said at page 6: "When §409(a) used
the term 'representative', we are entitled to give that term its ordinary meaning.
And, in its ordinary meaning, the term 'representative' denotes a person who acts
on behalf of another." While it is true that a representative acts on behalf of
another the Board's definition has in the instant case resulted in a broaded interpretation that the restricted sense in which the word is ordinarily applied.
To the layman one represents another when he acts in place of or as a substitute for the other. See, WEBSTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2114 (2d.

Ed. 1951) :
"A representative is one who represents others or another in a special
capacity; an agent, deputy, or substitute."
The lawyers' definition does not differ in any substantial respect from that
applied by the layman. See, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (3rd Ed. 1933):
"Representation is the act of one person representing or standing in
place of another; and he who represents or stands in the place of another
is termed his representative."
In Gilman v. Jacks, 91 A.2d 207 (Maine 1953) at page 209 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine characterized representation when considering Maine's
Public Utility Act:
•...a person is not a representative of an outside interest such as
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sider the relationship's effect on the public interest the type of relationship
set out in the Act must presently exist. It is submitted that the CAB
confused the issue of relationship with that of adversity.
In the Airlines Negotiating Conference Case2 7 the CIAB seemed to adopt
the approach suggested by the second alternative. In this case various air
carriers formed a non-profit organization headed by directors and executives
of the carriers to act as the exclusive representative of the carriers in
collective bargaining negotiations with pilots. When the CAB considered
this situation it did not hold that a Section 409(a) interlocking relationship
existed and thereupon approved the relationship on the basis it was not
adverse to the public interest. Instead the Board held (1) that Conference
members were not serving in a dual directorate because the Conference was
not a Section 409(a) company, and (2) that Conference members did not
represent other Conference members when serving as directors of their
28
own air carriers.
The policy of the Civil Aeronautics Act is to prevent any type of interlocking relationship which might substantially impede competition in the
air transportation industry.29 Another policy which should not be overlooked concerns the consideration of not unduly restricting the activities
of experienced business executives.8 0 Courts have emphasized the policy of
protecting competition at the expense of business freedom.31 The Lehman
Brothers case is typical of this tendency. But under the circumstances of
this case, and interpretation of Section 409(a) seems to justify giving more
consideration to business realities.
an investment banker if he is not in any way under the control of such
interest and answerable to it for his acts."
Partners, since they are all principals, are never under the control of one another
within the meaning of the above quotation.
Even taking the courts interpretation of representation, i.e., a partner-director
represents his fellow partners when he acts in a manner beneficial to the partnership, the court found no situation wherein the various directors were presently
so acting.
27 8 C.A.B. 354 (1947).
28 Id. at 358, the CAB reasoned:
"The conference organization would not give rise to interlocking
relationships within the purview of §409 (a) of the C.A.A., unless the
conference were found by the Board to be a person engaged in any phase
of aeronautics within the meaning of that section . . ."
"It does not appear that the conference has such a connection with
the development of aviation per se as to give rise to the kind of situation
contemplated by §409 (a) ...... Further,it does not appear that the
conference gives rise to any interlocking relationship as between the
member air carriers." (Emphasis added.)
29 See note 1 supra.
Sec. 401 (d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of
the Postal Service, and of the national defense.
80 Air carriers desire to obtain for their boards of directors, as do many
large concerns, experienced business executives who lend their skill and advice
to management. It is common knowledge, for instance, that successful banking
officials are sought out for directorships of various businesses. Many examples of
situations wherein bank officials (directors and officers) of the same banking
institutions are also directors of various competing railroads can be found in
PooR's REGISTER op DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES, (1954).
31 Cf. The opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Agnew v. Board of Governors,
329 U.S. 441 (1947), construing the Banking Act of 1933. The language of the
Act was subordinated to its broad overall policy. The court held that a firm
twenty-six (26) per cent of whose gross income came from underwriting was
primarily engaged as an underwriter and rejected the position that something
in excess of fifty (50) per cent would be required for a holding that the concern
was primarily an underwriter.

